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This paper describes the use of  cute communications (visual or verbal, and in various media) as an 
organizational communication strategy prevalent in Japan and emerging in western countries. Insights are 
offered for the use of  such communications and for the understanding/critique thereof. 
It is first established that cuteness in Japan–kawaii–is chiefly studied as a sociocultural or psychological 
phenomenon, with too little analysis of  its near-omnipresent institutionalization and conveyance as 
mass media. The following discussion clarifies one reason for this gap in research–the widespread 
conflation of  ʻorganizational communication’ with advertising/branding, notwithstanding the variety of  
other messaging–public relations, employee communications, public service announcements, political 
campaigns–conveyed through cuteness by Japanese institutions. It is then argued that what few 
theorizations exist of  organizational kawaii communications overemphasize their negative aspects or 
potentials, attributing to them both too much iniquity and too much influence. 
Outside of  Japan studies, there is even less up-to-date scholarship on organizational cuteness, critical 
or otherwise. And there are no such studies at all, whether focused on Japan or elsewhere, that integrate 
intercultural insights. In a preliminary contribution toward such knowledge, we discuss the understudied, 
longstanding, and increasing use of  this strategy by western companies. Points of  comparison and 
contrast with Japanese kawaii are highlighted, in both its organizational and pop-cultural aspects, drawing 
also on sociological studies of  the west’s current cuteness craze. Guiding insights are offered and future 
research directions specified, both for those seeking to advise western organizations in communicating 
cutely, and for those concerned that such softening power will be abused.
Keywords: Cuteness, Kawaii, Character Branding, Strategic Organizational Communication
Introduction
Contemporary Japanese society teems with kawaii (ʻcute’) images and styling. This ebullient aesthetic 
suffuses every form of  mass media: manga (comics) and anime (cartoons) as well as high-minded ʻpop art’; 
fashion and all genres of  entertainment, including erotica; advertising and public relations; industrial design 
including robotics; instruction manuals and street signage, etc. Kawaii, in all its ubiquity, has been the subject 
of  much commentary in recent decades, both scholarly and journalistic, and by both Japanese and non-Japanese 
observers. Most such scrutiny has explored the subject as a psychological or cultural phenomenon, explaining 
kawaii as an instinctive, universally human affect, or exploring it as a reflection of  traditional or changing 
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societal norms, either worldwide or in regard to particular countries and/or cultures. In all such cases, analytic 
focus has mostly been applied to cognitive processing, to consumer interpretations and self-expression, or to the 
aesthetics of  artists and designers. 
Less attention has been paid to producer intent in the sense of  organizational strategic communication in 
any of  its varied manifestations: official rhetoric, visuals, or other sensory forms (i.e., jingles, anthems) aimed at 
informing, persuading, and establishing good will – such as advertising/branding and design, public relations, 
employee communications, public service announcements, and diplomacy or propaganda. This dearth of  
research exists despite the prevalence of  kawaii in all types of  organizational communications, from all types of  
Japanese institutions – corporate, governmental, or otherwise. And there has been nearly no analysis drawing 
comparisons and contrasts between Japanese and western organizational communication in this regard. This 
absence of  cross-cultural scholarship persists despite a recent increase in ʻcute communications’ among western 
companies, often inspired by Japanese exemplars, and even though such ʻsoft power’ strategies have long been 
more widespread among western organizations than is usually recognized.
This study seeks to fill that research gap in an exploratory, theory-building way. It does so by synthesizing 
insights from scholarship on ʻcuteness culture’ in Japan and the west, on kawaii organizational communication 
and design, on the psychology of  cuteness, and on character branding. Advice is advanced for western 
organizational communicators regarding the strategic benefits and risks of  ʻcute communications.’ Broader 
insights are also offered to a general readership, for improved critical understanding of  the cuteness zeitgeist 
now ascending in western popular culture and mass media.  
The following Section 1 begins this paper with a survey of  commentary, by scholars as well as journalists, art 
critics, and other pundits, on kawaii as an aspect of  Japanese culture and aesthetics. The review concentrates on 
a divide between more and less critical apprehensions of  the phenomenon. A somewhat similar analytic divide 
structures Section 2, our overview of  the much sparser literature on kawaii organizational communications. 
Here the distinction lies between critical appraisals and a more applied scholarship proffering principles of  
kawaii design and communication strategy. This discussion segues into the following Section 3, where our 
focus turns to western ʻcute communications.’ A literature survey spans psychological research, business 
studies on character branding, and sociological explorations of  popular culture. This review establishes that 
western organizations have a history of  cuteness appeals that is under-recognized – most notably by those 
fixated on kawaii’s putatively unique ʻJapanese-ness.’ Moreover, Section 3 sheds light on a present uptick in 
western organizational uptake of  such communication strategies, especially by advertisers. Section 4 concludes 
the paper by specifying future directions for research into cuteness as a rhetorical appeal aimed at western 
consumers and publics.       
1. Kawaii Aesthetics and Culture
In everyday English parlance, where the term kawaii is increasingly adopted (Nittono, 2016), this Japanese 
adjective is usually translated simply as ʻcute.’ Of  English-language dictionaries Webster’s, Dictionary.com, 
Cambridge, Oxford, and Collins, only the latter two offer definitions of  kawaii, both emphasizing its Japanese 
cultural specificity:
Adjective:  denoting a Japanese artistic and cultural style that emphasizes the quality of  cuteness, using 
bright colours and characters with a childlike appearance. 
Noun: (in Japanese art and culture) the quality of  being lovable or cute. (Kawaii [1], n.d.)
Adjective: (in the context of  Japanese popular culture) cute.
Mass noun: The quality of  being cute, or items that are cute. (Kawaii [2], n.d.)
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Official Japanese definitions offer more semantic detail. Nittono (2016) translates from the 2000 edition of  
Nihon Kokugo Daijiten:
kawai-i (adjective) (1) looks miserable and raises sympathy. pitiable. pathetic. piteous. (2) attractive. cannot 
be neglected. cherished. beloved. (3) has a sweet nature. lovely. (a) (of  faces and figures of  young women 
and children) adorable. attractive. (b) (like children) innocent. obedient. touching. (4) (of  things and shapes) 
attractively small. small and beautiful. (5) trivial. pitiful. (used with slight disdain). (p. 81).
However, as Nittono (2016) points out, these “somewhat contradictory meanings” reflect the word’s historic 
connotative shifts as well as the subjectivity, context-dependency, and situation-specificity, with which Japanese 
people today use and understand kawaii. In everyday usage, it is applied to a voluminous range of  imagery, 
fashion, and stylistics. For prime examples: saucer-eyed cartoon characters; hyper-saccharine pop music; 
childlike or otherwise quirky clothing, accessories, and body language; very bright or pastel colours; soft or 
frilly textures; circles or blobs; hyper-rococo faux-European motifs; rounded cursives; infants and toddlers; 
small and/or chubby adults; and baby or tiny animals. As is the case with ʻcuteness’ in English – those seeking 
to precisely define the word kawaii have found themselves grappling with its deeply contextual polysemy. Pop 
media scholar Nobuyoshi Kurita has even called it a “magic term” that encompasses everything positive (as 
cited in Kageyama, 2006, p. 2).
Kawaii is primarily associable with girls and women (Nittono, 2016). However, many Japanese males of  
all ages appreciate or adopt the aesthetic and attitude, without irony. It can semantically overlap with ʻcool’ 
in a way that defies understanding for westerners. Its positivity frequently goes beyond ʻcute,’ to take on the 
moral qualities of  innocence and purity; however, kawaii can equally imply naughtiness and a lack of  reserve. 
Japanese subcultures, and even more popular media, often aesthetically combine kawaii with eroticism and 
grotesquerie, in genres labelled by neologisms such as ero-kawaii, guro-kawaii and kimo-kawaii (ʻcreepy-cute’). 
As well, in general usage, kawaii itself  sometimes has negative connotations, typically involving inordinate, or 
spurious, submissiveness and frailty (Madge, 1997; Nittono, 2016). 
Moves to establish and explain the polyvalent pragmatics1 of  kawaii sentiment are often prefaced with 
etymological and historical parsings. These typically note that the word’s antecedents, and its usage in Japanese 
classics like The Tale of  Genji (ca. 1000 - 1020), mostly conveyed pitifulness – today the common adjective 
kawaiso still means ʻpitiful’ – and that only in later centuries did its ʻcute/adorable’ associations emerge. These 
positive overtones then came to the fore in the twentieth century, partly or frequently displacing the term’s 
original pathos. Scholars debate the extent to which this was a pre- or postwar sociolinguistic development 
(Birkett, 2012). 
Certainly, contemporary kawaii culture, both Japanese and global, is intrinsically tied to commodification, 
and so can largely be traced back to the economic boom-then-bubble of  Japan’s recent decades. This kitschy 
efflorescence reached full force in Japan during the 1970s, beneath the aegises of  Hello Kitty – as character-
creator Sanrio both capitalized upon and cultivated market expansion from girls to women (McVeigh, 2000b) 
– and the nation’s real-life albeit heavily ʻmanufactured’ pop idols. By the mid-1980s kawaii permeated 
every nook of  the Japanese archipelago, manifesting in “pink road diggers” and “police boxes in the form of  
gingerbread houses” (Kinsella, 1995, as cited in Peek, 2009, p. 3). Since then kawaii culture and consumerism 
has been explained and evaluated by a wide range of  Japanese and foreign commentators. Scholars, artists 
and art critics, journalists and politicians, have all championed or denounced kawaii alongside those aspects of  
Japanese society they take it to reflect and influence. 
Kawaii is exalted or excoriated for a range of  reasons. As with pop culture anywhere, kawaii producers 
1 The branch of  linguistics studying actual communicative usage, as opposed to formal grammar and semantics.
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and consumers, when called upon to explain the worth of  their goods and services, often wax tautological 
– kawaii is great because it’s kawaii! – and state or suggest that such truths cannot be put into words. The 
Japanese government is promoting popular culture abroad for pragmatic purposes, in hopes of  championing 
an export industry and of  wielding kawaii as ʻsoft power’ (Heng, 2014; Valaskivi, 2013). There are more 
learned glorifications as well. The sensibility is often linked to ancient Japanese idealism, love of  miniatures, 
and pantheism (think mascots as godlings) (Kageyama, 2006). Others perceive, in its blurring of  aesthetic 
boundaries – between childhood and adulthood, and between sentimentality and moral ambivalence – a 
binary-transcending mentality that makes Japan better-suited than the west to postmodernity. According 
to anthropologist Anne Allison, this “polymorphous perversity” helps explain the global spread of  kawaii 
alongside other types or aspects of  Japan’s popular culture (Allison, 2003, 2006). 
However, kawaii’s ʻperverse’ blurring of  boundaries between innocence and maturity is also the source 
of  much concern over an infantilization of  Japanese society. Takashi Murakami, perhaps Japan’s most 
internationally-famous contemporary artist, combines anime-inspired kawaii with surrealism, eroticism, and 
grotesquerie. His ʻSuperflat’ manifestos wryly proclaim the unwillingness or inability of  modern Japanese 
artists to recognize defining distinctions in western artistic tradition: ʻhigh’ and ʻlow’ culture, fine art and 
commercialism, adult and children’s entertainment, good and evil, depth and surface. In Murakami’s professed 
view, this ʻflatness’ stems from the trauma of  psychic emasculation that atomic bombing wreaked upon Japan 
(Ivy, 2006).
Less equivocal and abstract denunciations of  kawaii abound throughout political and popular discourse, 
delivered by Japanese and foreigners. Such condemnation spans the ideological spectrum, from right to 
left. Cultural purists rue the displacement of  Japan’s traditionally refined, subtle aesthetics by everything 
opposite in kawaii. Conservatives and progressives alike damn its purported suspension of  adulthood, if  for 
different reasons. Both decry the political apathy – the lack of  patriotism or reformist spirit – that most kawaii 
consumerism reflects and encourages. Both heap scorn on its hedonistic consumerism. And as happens with 
pornography in the west, social conservatives make strange bedfellows with those feminists (mostly foreign, in 
this case) who condemn the borderline or blatant pedophilia of  much ʻLolita’ manga and anime (Ashcraft, 2010; 
Lah, 2010). Japan’s political pundits on the right target the protracted unwillingness of  kawaii-besotted Japanese 
women to get on with the duties of  motherhood (and of  videogame-obsessed males to forge careers). 
Of  course, many left-wing critics deplore kawaii’s propagation of  submissive femininity. In such regards, 
though, some feminists and social theorists offer a measured or partial defence of  kawaii culture: “I cannot deny 
that the presentation of  young women as kawaii can reinforce an image of  women as subservient although 
... I also wish to stress that the aesthetic has a nonconforming or escapist aspect to it” (Madge, 1997, p. 157; 
see also Kinsella, 1995). This thrust of  such arguments runs thus: Especially in a society like Japan’s, where 
opportunities for politicized consciousness and agitation are simply more circumscribed than in the west – 
where ʻthe nail that sticks out gets hammered down’ – there is a subversive edge to the decades-long escape that 
so many women make into kawaii whimsy. The same is said of  the solipsism that transforms so many Japanese 
men into hikikomori shut-ins or ʻgrass-eating,’ metrosexual slackers. These millennial movements are not 
revolutions advocating progressive agendas. Nevertheless, they are real rejections of  Japan’s traditional social 
order, and in toto they are transforming the nation, most starkly through low birth rates.  
That feminist debate is intra-ideological, between parties who are both opposed to Japanese social 
conservatism. This has a rough parallel in ʻcritical’ social theory as applied in and to western countries such 
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as those in Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand.2 On one hand ʻcultural studies’ scholars find, 
in the styles and stances of  youth subculture, symbolic dissent – legitimate however partial – against the 
hegemony of  mainstream conservative ideology. In contrast, neo-Marxist scholars of  ʻpolitical economy,’ with 
their materialist focus on class structures, find popular culture and its disaffected poses to be escapist at best, 
if  not a disseminator of  reactionary attitudes – hedonic individualism, consumerism, and sexism. In turn, 
defending their scholarly interest in popular media products (and their love of  them), cultural studies devotees 
accuse the political economists of  dour and reductive economic determinism (Babe, 2010).
2. Kawaii as ʻSoft Powerʼ Strategic Organizational Communication
No less than in other walks of  life, the kawaii aesthetic pervades Japanese organizational communication. 
This is most commonly or obviously the case with corporate branding, such as mascots marketing a company 
or character goods produced by it, or the kawaii attributes of  actor spokespeople, advertising jingles, and logo 
font, along with other design elements. However, the kawaii aesthetic is strategically applied by all manner of  
other Japanese institutions: political, educational, religious, and even military (Frühstück, 2009). It is directed 
by these institutions at all their stakeholder audiences, both external and internal, from employees to voters and 
broader publics both in Japan and abroad. The strategic intent of  such communications may be to persuade 
stakeholders to adopt a specific behaviour, such as buying, voting, or recycling; to inculcate a more generally 
favourable impression; or even to improve information intake (Nittono, Fukushima, Yano & Moriya, 2012). 
Many of  this paper’s explanations and arguments about kawaii apply to all such manifestations. Therefore 
the authors refer generally to organizational communication (strategy) as a term including external or internal 
and verbal or (especially) visual messaging; advertising for all manner of  goods and services; public relations, 
employee communication, and foreign relations; public service announcements; instruction manuals, and 
product or even architectural design. (In the 1990s, a college redesigned its campus to look like Disneyland, after 
which applications increased threefold (Madge, 1997)).  
In all such cases, standard kawaii elements – girlish women, squeaky voices, hyper-happy pop muzak, 
rounded cursives, and especially big-eyed cartoon characters – are key elements of  strategic messaging aimed 
at influencing and/or informing audiences. The basic objectives here are obvious: Organizations want to 
endear themselves to stakeholders; to make their message content simpler and engaging; and in the case of  
impersonal or authority-wielding institutions, to soften their image. Most research into kawaii organizational 
communication, or at least touching on it, is ʻsiloed’ into disciplinary subfields of  management studies and 
political science, with scarce attempts to advance general insights about organizational communication more 
broadly speaking. There are a number of  studies focused on kawaii advertising for Japanese and international 
markets (e.g., Allison, 2006; Otmazgin, 2014; Steinberg, 2012). Probably more academic and journalistic attention 
has fixated on Japanese government communication strategy, especially the omnipresent deployment of  
mascots – by electoral campaigners (e.g., Aoki, 2013; Torres, 2012); by police and military forces (e.g., Frühstück, 
2009); by local authorities and industries, aiming to sustain and brand their communities and regions (e.g., 
Birkett, 2012; Ripley and Henry, 2014); and most recently, with official efforts to promote “Cool Japan” abroad, 
both in hopes of  boosting cultural business sectors and of  brandishing diplomatic ʻsoft power’ (e.g., Borggreen, 
2 The authors use ʻwestern’ or ʻthe west’ as a cultural umbrella term to encapsulate ethnically Caucasian-majority, 
comparatively wealthy, liberal-democratic countries and regions, and we follow common practice in attributing 
attitudinal, behavioural, and institutional similarities to the mainstream populations of  these places. However, we 
also recognize that substantive differences in all such regards distinguish each ʻwestern’ country/region from the 
others, and we recognize the methodological hazard inherent in making any cultural generalization. This caveat 
informs our decision to not capitalize the word west, on grounds that doing so too strongly suggests monolithic 
cultural uniformity. 
44
Journal of  International and Advanced Japanese Studies      University of  Tsukuba Volume 10 / February 2018
2011; McGray, 2002; Yano, 2009). 
There is has not been much theory-building work on kawaii aspects of  Japanese organizational 
communication strategy in its general sense: messaging meant to inform, persuade, and perpetuate goodwill 
with all types of  stakeholders for all types of  purpose. The scholarship that has broadly conceptualized this 
aspect of  Japanese organizational communication can be divided into theoretical and functional interests. 
On the one hand, ʻcritical’ scholars mostly frame managerial kawaii as a manipulative, smiley-faced mask 
for domination and deception on the part of  authorities and businesses. A more ʻapplied’ vein of  study, 
usually written by Japanese designers and engineers, formulates principles and processes for making kawaii 
communications more effective, especially in visual modes and vis-à-vis high technology such as computer 
interfaces and robotics. 
The ideological critiques of  the first camp routinely reference, as a principal influence, anthropologist 
Brian McVeigh’s insights into the institutional interests behind the design and dissemination of  kawaii 
communications, products, and styles (e.g., 1996, 2000a, 2000b). He explains how “[c]uteness communicates 
power relations ... effectively combining weakness, submissiveness and humility with influence, domination 
and control” (1996, p, 291). McVeigh invokes Michel Foucault’s points about power – that it must often function 
invisibly, and that it often “induces pleasure” in subjects (Foucault, 1978, p. 36). These cardinal insights are 
related to psychoanalyst Takeo Doi’s (1971/1973) diagnosis of  Japanese social relations as comprised of  mother-
child-like mutual dependencies. McVeigh warns: 
We should be aware of  how centres of  authority (state agencies, educators, large companies, etc.) attempt 
to associate themselves with smiling babies, innocent children, talking animals, pretty colours ... funny 
creatures and akarui (cheerful things). If  those in positions of  power can convince those below them that 
they are in fact not intimidating, the task of  persuading, influencing and controlling them becomes easier. 
(2000a, p. 150)  
The extent to which one shares McVeigh’s concerns will depend on how suspiciously one apprehends ʻcentres 
of  authority,’ both in general and in Japan. It will also depend on one’s beliefs regarding the power of  mass 
media to mould public opinion, for better or worse. When weighing this issue, it is worth considering some 
evident limits of  kawaii’s capacity to disarm people’s critical and rational faculties. 
For one example, immediately after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear catastrophe, powerplant operator Tepco 
stopped using kawaii communications, most notably its housewife cartoon-mascot Denko-chan. Since then, 
“Tepco’s post-3.11 TV ads have been limited to solemn apologies silently displayed across the screen, before 
disappearing altogether” (Sekiguchi, 2012, para. 8). One must conjecture about any reasons for this sudden 
shift in communication strategy, beyond cashed-strapped Tepco’s stated cost-cutting motives – “part of  our 
streamlining” (as cited in Sekiguchi, 2012, para. 9).  However, it is no great stretch to surmise that this decision 
partly stemmed from recognition that kawaii communications would not defuse so grave a crisis, and could 
instead give offense.
Beyond Tepco’s ʻfiring’ of  Denko-chan, a broader cuteness cull seems to be imminent, targeting Japan’s 
800-plus prefectural and municipal mascots, called yuru-kyara (ʻrelaxed characters’). These creatures 
mushroomed during the last decade, in cartoons and costumes, largely in response to the increased local 
autonomy that has come with political decentralization (Birkett, 2012, as cited in Walters, 2014, para. 1). The 
ʻstrategic communication’ purposes of  yuru-kyara are manifold, beyond putting an adorably benevolent face 
on administration and commerce. Often based on local folklore or industry, these figures assist in marketing 
domestic tourism, the most successful becoming national icons worth millions of  dollars to their sponsoring 
institutions. Rural domains also utilize yuru-kyara in attempts to shore up civic pride – “imagined community” 
(Walters, 2014, para. 2, citing Birkett, 2012) – in the face of  ongoing population shrinkage. However, their 
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heyday might be closing – or at least, their masters might need to produce more proof  of  their efficacy. In June 
2014, Japan’s finance ministry ordered local governments to reduce their taxpayer-supported use of  yuru-kyara, 
citing a dismissive internal report: “A majority of  them were created for vague ʻpublic relations purposes’ and 
some of  them were created just ʻbecause others have introduced mascots’” (as cited in “Japan Cracks Down,” 
para. 4).   
Broadly speaking, though, the national Japanese government has exploited cute-character branding 
as eagerly as has any toy or accessory company – but with an overall achievement record that remains 
mixed or indeterminate. New media technologies have helped secure some successes. Not only in Japan 
but generally, anthropomorphic spokes-avatars are proving especially efficacious for enlivening digitally 
interactive communications (Vranica, 2012). And with the recent lifting of  Japanese restrictions against online 
campaigning, much was made of  successful multimedia mascot handling during the 2012 general elections, by 
the now ruling LDP (e.g., Aoki, 2013) and Japan’s Communist Party (e.g., Blair, 2013), across videogame-app and 
social-media platforms. 
Yet in the case of  foreign relations, appraisals of  Japan’s mascot-mediated communication, at least among the 
commentariat, have ranged between scepticism and scorn (Borggreen, 2011) – with many caveats and criticisms 
hypothesizing flaws from a communication-strategy standpoint. Much of  this assessment engages the overall 
ʻCool Japan’ initiative. Dating from the mid-2000s, this is the overarching campaign through which Japan seeks 
to promote abroad all facets of  its culture – traditional, popular, and even subcultural – as a twofold plank for 
marketing and diplomacy. Doubters forward many arguments (see, e.g., Valaskivi, 2013). The chief  amongst 
them is this: However much ʻcool’ has proven amenable to commodification, it is not subject to guidance by 
governments, especially avowed social conservatives (e.g., Chiang, 2014; Valaskivi, 2013).3 Others opine that 
cute, comics, and cartoons are synonymous with ʻcool’ for only specific segments of  western youth. Therefore, 
Japan’s branded characters, manga, and anime, will never have the near-universal appeal of, say, Hollywood 
movie stars (e.g., Reynolds, 2009). From a communication standpoint, such critiques amount to the charge that 
ʻCool Japan’ lacks a requisite air of  authenticity.
Kawaii plays a key tenor in ʻCool Japan,’ and a succession of  mascot champions are trundled forth in its 
name. During 2008, Japan’s Ministry of  Foreign Affairs (MOFA) officially dubbed Japan’s most famous cartoon 
cats, Hello Kitty and Doraemon, ambassadors of  tourism and anime; and in 2013 the latter character was 
named chief  envoy for Japan’s (successful) bid to host the 2020 Olympics (Chavez, 2013). English-language 
commentators reacted with bemusement and mild condescension to these news items. Teasings about cross-
cultural tone-deafness shaded into sharper objections with the 2009 MOFA appointment of  three human, young 
female fashion idols as “cute ambassadors,” representing different kawaii street-culture styles. This trio included 
one then 19-year-old, Shizuka Fujioka, costumed in a miniskirted school uniform. Offended western observers 
perceived her as embodying official sanction for the infantilization of  Japanese women, if  not for the illustrated 
pedophilia in much ero-kawaii manga and anime. 
Bloomberg correspondent William Pesek called the leggy-schoolgirl persona “creepy” (2009, para. 3), 
and anthropologist Laura Miller even compared the globetrotting of  all three kawaii emissaries to “global 
exploitation and sex trafficking of  young women” (Miller, 2011, p. 20). Of  course, the ʻchattering classes’ 
can themselves prove tone deaf. Time will tell how populations en masse respond to Japan’s nascent kawaii 
outreach. Or time might tell, given the difficulties of  measuring attitudinal shifts at any mass scale, much less 
international ones (Valaskivi, 2013). For one complication among many, it will be a very fine-tuned survey that 
can parse between any global goodwill engendered by Japan’s diplomatic darlings, versus grassroots fandom 
inspired by self-anointed kawaii crusaders among western pop iconicity such as Avril Lavigne (Franich, 2014) 
and Gwen Stefani (Ahn, 2005), or even by lesser-known social-media ʻinfluencers.’    
3 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe recently declared ankle-length kimonos to best represent Japanese ʻcool’ (Booth, 2014).
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If  the plain and the plausible limits to kawaii’s ʻsoft power’ provide some counterweight to critical concerns 
about organizational propaganda, so should its positive potentials. To the extent that kawaii communications 
do work to nudge Japanese citizenry toward beneficial ends – for example, signs showing big-eyed, babylike 
cartoon characters causing drivers to slow down – such cuteness appeals should be widely applied and 
applauded. Indeed, they might even be proving increasingly applicable and appropriate in the west. Such an 
evolution is urged, in a recent New York Times editorial (2014, July 19), by geriatrician Louise Aronson. Given 
the U.S.’s greying demographics, she argues, Americans have no choice but to hope their elderly prove as 
susceptible as Japanese seniors to the charms and (seeming) solicitude of  sweetly-designed robot caregivers. 
She suspects that they will do so, but repines: “Even within the medical community, this idea that machines 
could help fulfill more than just physical needs meets largely with skepticism, and occasionally with outrage” 
(para. 8).    
Unsurprisingly, there is a good deal of  investigation by psychologists, designers, and engineers into what 
makes kawaii work – all of  it premised on the belief  that such mass communications are typically benign if  
not beneficial for organizational or societal interests, at least when effective. One example is the kansei school 
of  industrial-design thought, formed in the 1970s. Its international network of  technologists (e.g., Hotogi & 
Hagiwara, 2014; Saeed, 2012) have pushed boundaries in imbuing all manner of  hardware devices and software 
interfaces with a range of  affective properties, such as kawaii or calming. Kansei-inspired mood-modifying 
machines run a gamut from robots and hairdryers to anthropomorphized ATMs. 
There are just as many studies done on the user/audience-reception end of  kawaii effects.  For one 
example, Nittono, Fukushima, Yano and Moriya (2012) reported that not only did subjects viewing cute 
images subsequently become more careful at tasks – which previous studies had shown – but their focus and 
completion speed also improved. The authors found no appreciable gender differences in this response. They 
were careful to note that their participants were Japanese university students, so that these findings weren’t 
generalizable to employees or to non-Japanese, both of  whom they suggested might not be so receptive to 
kawaii. 
This paper garnered wide circulation in the English-language business press (e.g., Bender, 2012; Koh, 2012; 
Steadman, 2012). However, most writers hyped the research as though it suggested that “browsing LOLcats” 
(Bender, 2012, para. 1) could improve job performance. As well, very few commentators addressed the question 
of  cultural differences. (Steadman, 2012, was an exception.) This lazy thinking bespeaks a conceptual lacuna 
that is no less pronounced in scholarship. When it comes to kawaii, cute, or whatever the basic affect is called in 
other languages, there remains a paucity of  empirical analysis and theory-building concerning cross-cultural 
contrasts, similarities, or convergences. And there is no such research found by the authors which brings this 
issue to bear on organizational communication strategy, broadly speaking. 
3. Cute Communications in the West – Past and Present Practice and Research 
Kawaii’s rough English-language parallel is cute. English dictionaries define the word as describing a specific 
type of  attractiveness – “endearing” in Oxford Living Dictionary’s terms (Cute [3], n.d.), and “especially in a 
childish, youthful, or delicate way,” according to Merriam-Webster (Cute [2], n.d.). Much less semantic variety is 
attributed to cute(ness) than is the case with Nihon Kokugo Daijiten’s previously quoted definitional detailing of  
kawaii (as cited in Nittono, 2016). However, dictionaries note that cuteness can refer, in North American informal 
usage, to adult sex appeal. And as with kawaii’s original connotation of  pitiful pathos (Birkett, 2012), cute has 
less ʻendearing’ etymological roots. It originally stemmed, in the early eighteenth century, from the root acute as 
a personal descriptor meaning “clever; shrewd” (Cute [1], n.d; Cute [3], n.d.). This meaning has echoes in current 
North American informal usage, where cute can label someone as “clever or cunning, especially in a self-seeking 
or superficial way” (Cute [3], n.d.). Some dictionaries also emphasize that the word can today informally denote 
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a failure of  communication strategy: “straining for effect; artificial” (Cute [1], n.d.). All such polysemic variances 
should be borne in mind during the following discussion, though for the purposes of  this paper, cute(ness) 
and kawaii both refer in general terms to their most commonly understood meaning: ʻendearing’ childlike 
attractiveness. 
Much of  contemporary, applied Japanese kawaii-effects research branches out from a western tradition 
of  study into the psychology of  cute appeals, traceable at least back to Austrian ethologist Konrad Lorenz’s 
1940s Kindenschema findings (e.g., 1943). He and following ʻcute-ologists’(?)4 explore a basic human response 
to physical features found in babies – roundness, fragility and clumsiness, big heads and eyes, short limbs, 
etc. – but also in similarly aligned adults, animals, cartoons, and even machines or other objects. Such cuteness 
often signals or suggests a range of  personality traits, such as vulnerability, playfulness, affection, curiosity, 
innocence, and naiveté (or ignorance and inferiority). In Lorenz’s terms, perceived cuteness “releases” protective 
and adoring reactions in people. Many analyses find that the effect is comparatively heightened in women, 
whether from socialized or biological instincts, but this all remains a matter of  mixed results and debate 
(Nittono, Fukushima, Yano, & Moriya, 2012; Nittono, 2016; Sherman, Haidt, & Coan, 2009). Current research is 
also uncovering a range of  other cuteness aspects and affects, from ʻwhimsy’ arousing self-indulgence (Nenkov 
& Scott, 2014), to ʻsincerity’ inspiring stakeholder trust and brand loyalty (Folse, Garretson, Netemayer, & 
Burton, 2012).
Since Lorenz’s seminal experiments in the 1940s, western ʻcuteness studies’ has continued uninterrupted, 
often independently of  the newer kawaii vein of  inquiry, though in some obscurity compared to its Japan-
focused counterpart. Recently renewed interest and work in this transatlantic tradition, within a variety of  
disciplines, has doubtless been spurred by the au courant fascination with Japanese cases and contexts. 
However, cuteness in all its cultural and national flavours is increasingly drawing attention. Indeed, much of  
such research adds to knowledge without making (or needing) any reference to kawaii. In one recent example, a 
U.S. study with American participants, Nenkov and Scott (2014) establish the important distinction that much 
cuteness has little if  anything to do with Kindenschema – it needn’t remind people of  babies. 
The authors find that cuteness can instead present and prime a “whimsical” sensibility that triggers 
ʻfun’ feelings rather than care, thereby inclining respondents to careless self-indulgence (and perhaps even 
aggression). Such a finding fruitfully expands the scholarly conception of  cute beyond strictly neotenic5 or 
kawaii parameters. This helps to delineate an emerging, ʻindigenously’ western, variant of  cute: one typically 
more Jetsons than Sailor Moon, stylistically speaking, and more ironic or ʻadult’ in sentiment. Recognizing 
the risk of  generalization with such terms as ʻwestern,’ it should be noted here that sardonic distance from 
sentimental appeals such as cuteness is often said to distinguish Anglophone cultures more so than Latin 
ones, with Northern European societies perhaps occupying a middle ground. In such regards, famed cross-
cultural theorist Geert Hofstede’s son and collaborator Gert Jan Hofstede links cultural differences in humour, 
including cuteness and kitsch, to his father’s broader masculine/feminine spectrum, which respectively 
situates Anglophone and Latin regions at either extreme, the former oriented more so towards pragmatism 
and scepticism, whereas the latter more readily or openly embrace sentimentality and emotionality in general 
(Hofstede, 2009). 
  Theoretic discoveries and refinements regarding ʻwestern cuteness’ will likely also feed into applied 
communications. Unlike scholars and journalists, advertisers and other communications practitioners never 
really forgot the ʻsoftening power’ of  cute in western culture, and they are now turning it to ever more, and 
more effective, uses (Vranica, 2012). Just as western cuteness studies sometimes draws from kawaii scholarship, 
4 The subfield is sometimes called neoteny, though this term is usually reserved for the condition in which adults 
retain juvenile physical or psychological characteristics.
5 “Neoteny: the retention of  juvenile features in the adult animal” (Oxford Living Dictionaries, n.d.)
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but also exists as an older, independent strain, the same applies to the oft-related subfield of  ʻspokes-character’ 
branding. 
However, there has been nearly no intercultural cross-fertilization of  character-branding knowledge across 
regions. Such myopic ethnocentrism is a shortcoming in marketing research generally. Usually, western-focused 
studies state or suggest universality to their findings – whether from inattention to other markets, or inordinate 
belief  in the westernizing ʻconvergence’ of  globalization (deMooij, 2004; Limon, Kahle, & Orth, 2009). On the 
other hand, all types of  kawaii studies tend to over-emphasize the uniqueness of  this aesthetic, in a form of  
ʻbizarre Japan’ Orientalism (or self-orientalizing nihonjinron, in the case of  Japanese writers). The truth is that 
mostly nonhuman mascots proliferate everywhere in the world – if  even more so in Asia, or more obviously. 
These anthropomorphic agents probably constitute the main mode of  organizational cute communications, 
though other conveyances abound: “brand name, logo and symbol, slogan, packag[ing] and the like” (Huang, 
Hu, & Wu, 2013, p. 40). 
Western companies were pioneers in mascot communications, which has a history stretching back to the 
late 1800s, when printing technology freed up the medium, and the rise of  big business created a need to 
simulate personal connections between proprietors and their publics. Many of  today’s most iconic personified 
trademarks, such as Tony the Tiger and the Michelin Man, range between fifty and a hundred years in age or 
more (Callcott & Lee, 1995). And western corporations have not been the only organizations to thereby soften 
up their stakeholders. Disney’s critters very effectively emitted a range of  U.S. wartime communications, from 
propaganda to military training videos. Their efficacy in this respect was largely attributable to the fact that 
it wasn’t until the 1960s that western societies developed today’s perception of  comics and cartoons as strictly 
juvenile fare (Raiti, 2007). 
However, to some degree, this western distinction between ʻadult’ and ʻchildren’s’ media has been a matter of  
popular and scholarly misperception. Over the postwar decades, adult westerners in many nations did become 
comparatively inured to cuteness, or indisposed to acknowledge its softening power. And today the aesthetic 
features less in western organizational communications, especially outside of  branding, than is the case in 
Japan, where manga and anime mediate all types of  institutional content. However, although eclipsed in this 
regard by their Japanese counterparts, western companies never stopped advertising to adults with a plenitude 
of  cutesy appeals. These affective tactics have continued – widely though in some abatement, and largely 
unstudied – alongside more distinctively western brand traits such as ʻrugged,’ ʻedgy,’ or ʻsexy’ (cf. Aaker, 
Benet-Martinez, & Garolera, 2001). The extent to which Japan monopolizes the mode is somewhat overstated, 
explicitly or through implication, by nearly all commentary on kawaii organizational communication.
Among English-speaking countries, an increase in cute advertising, and belated scholarly attention to this 
tradition, took place in the 1990s. Baby-boomer nostalgia was a factor here (Callcott & Lee, 1995), and the new 
cuteness was often couched sexily or ironically, in ʻretro’ or absurdist fashions. As an added influence, it is 
also at this time that kawaii overtook North America and Europe, spearheaded, in particular, by Sanrio as the 
company capitalized on the same blurring of  childhood and adult markets that it pioneered in Japan (McVeigh, 
2000b). Many U.S. technology firms rival any Japanese institution in cute communications; their intention is 
plainly to persuade stakeholders – customers but also the public more broadly, if  not government regulators 
as well – that they’re hastening a ʻwarm and fuzzy’ future. Aside from Telus’s adorable animals, Apple’s apple, 
or Android’s R2D2-esque mascot – round, awkward, babylike – consider the strenuous output of  silly company 
names: Google, Twitter, Bing, Yelp, Hulu, etc. Tellingly, the first prototype of  Google’s driverless car looked “like 
a cross between a Volkswagen Beetle and a Disneyland ride” (Garber, 2014, para. 4).
During the 2000s another escalation of  cute communications ensued, though lay business writers have taken 
note of  the trend before any published organizational-communication scholarship. The increasing centrality 
of  visual communications leads management consultant Dan Pink to predict as “inevitable” (cited in Clark, 
2008, ques. 2) that western organizations will more widely adopt Japan’s use of  cartoon and comic mediums for 
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persuasive and informative communications. Maclean’s senior culture writer Anne Kingston (2014) notes that 
Generation Y has become old enough for nostalgia marketing, so that cartoon advertisement and art, recalling 
the halcyon 1980s and 1990s, is undergoing now-cyclical resurgence. Wall Street Journal’s advertising editor, 
Suzanne Vranica (2012), attributes today’s trend in mascot messaging to the communicative affordances and 
constraints of  social media. The platform’s normative informality means ʻsoft sells’ become imperative, while 
its interactivity animates avatars with compelling ʻvirtual personality’ as they engage in cheerful dialogue with 
loyal or angry fans. 
There are organizational risks as well as benefits to implementing comics, cartoons, mascots, and other 
cute communications. The idiosyncrasies of  digital and social-media communications are one major strategic 
factor. A traditional benefit of  fictional trade mascots, especially ones created for the sponsor organization, 
lies in the control over their image that strategists can maintain. Contrariwise, human spokespeople, especially 
famous ones, have a tendency to engage in brand-tarnishing real-life behaviour (Callcott & Lee, 1995). This 
equation has been altered with double-edged consequence by new media, owing to its audience-participatory 
capacities. Popular corporate cartoon characters often become the basis for fan art, a genre that increasingly 
serves for companies as ʻuser-generated’ viral marketing, or is even crowdsourced for product design purposes 
(Brustein, 2014; Marrs, 2014). However, fan-rendered mascots can take on lives of  their own veering sharply 
from organizational interests. A search-engine scan of  images for “Erin from E-surance,” with the ʻsafe settings’ 
off, will reveal one reason why this company retired its sexy-cute, secret-agent spokes-cartoon (Edwards, 2010). 
In E-surance ads, Erin has been replaced with human nerds and old ladies – also cute, but less likely fodder for 
fan-art sexual fantasies.    
A more fundamental challenge in strategizing cute communications lies in hitting just the right emotive 
pitch for the moving target of  contemporary audiences. Perhaps especially at work, westerners remain less 
predisposed than Asians to cute appeals, or at least more loath to admit their charms (the persistently viral 
near-ubiquity of  ʻcat videos’ notwithstanding). Outside of  certain fandoms, the kawaii aesthetic cannot simply 
be transplanted wholesale, much less for the full catalogue of  organizational communications: PR, internal 
communications, manuals, nation branding, etc. (notwithstanding Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau’s 
character-emblazoned socks; Corsillo, 2017). However, despite recent business-press interest in kawaii research 
(e.g., Bender, 2012), there remains nearly no organizational cuteness scholarship conducted in light of  current, 
non-Asian and cross-cultural contexts. This is clearly a gap in knowledge that needs filling, both from the 
perspective of  organizational communicators and that of  their stakeholder audiences, external or internal.
Though organizational-communication research has yet to engage the subject, many cultural cognoscenti 
have augured an imminent ʻage of  cute’ in the west, or argued that this effervescence has already established 
itself  as one of  “the dominant aesthetics of  the twenty-first century” (McIntyre, 2015, p. 423; see also Kretowicz, 
2014; and Wittkower, 2009). Its emerging or ensconced ubiquity is pointed to by a panoply of  markers: the 
normalization of  pink colours in menswear (Baker, 2012); kawaii simultaneously establishing mainstream and 
underground cachet (Kretowick, 2014); a ʻbrony’ fan culture of  men from all walks of  life who adore the ʻMy 
Little Pony’ cartoon (Wigler, 2014); the cupcake craze (Emery, 2014); children’s movies with in-jokes for parents 
(McKay, 2011); adults who read children’s books (Graham, 2014); the fact that an emoji-only social site has been 
launched (Kingston, 2014); an ever-expanding number of  cute little cars (Patton, 2008); and perhaps above all, 
the internet’s infinitude of  kittens, lolcats, and babies.   
Just as many reasons are proposed for this pop-cultural paradigm shift. Wittkower (2009) ascribes a 
central role to technology, especially internet communications. In terms of  communication and interpretation 
strategies, producers and consumers alike infuse the tech sector’s organizational messages and machines with 
cuteness, as a gambit to allay anxiety over socio-technological change. Another factor involves the increased 
prevalence and prestige of  amateur media production. This DIY ethos accords more with cuteness, in all its 
shameless imperfections, than with the beauty of  professional design. Other media characteristics – the visual 
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nature of  much communication; the rapidity of  information flow; the ʻpull-oriented’ autonomy and anonymity 
of  consumer choice – orient our age toward a “desublimation” of  taste and thought, channeled via simple 
aesthetics and immediate affects: sexual, horrific, slapstick, and cute. 
Others point to broader societal shifts. Perhaps above all, there is the increasing economic centrality of  
women and girls, and their growing role as consumers, producers, and circulators of  new media (Luce, 2014). 
What McVeigh (2000b) pointed out of  Hello Kitty’s reign in Japan now holds true for kitsch in the west: it 
appeals to females as ʻcute’ when they are girls, as ʻcool’ when they are adolescent, and then as ʻcamp’ to women. 
As for men, most western metrosexuals don’t embrace cuteness per se, but they are modeling a masculinity that 
is consanguine with cuteness in its ʻpost-machismo’ (Ibsen, 2013). 
Recessionary trends are also diagnosed. Today’s trend towards valuing small possessions – from dwellings 
and cars to pets (“Twenty Trends,” n.d., item 5) – can perforce set the stage for an aesthetic of  cuteness. When 
Generation Y isn’t living in petite apartments, they are often nesting with their parents for longer than their 
precursors did. Some postulate that this delayed independence fosters a “child/adult liminality” (McIntyre, 
2015, p. 425) that helps account for protracted receptivity to juvenilia such as Harry Potter fiction. More 
sympathetically, many such critics also posit that the cuteness aesthetic, in its basal or absolute superficiality, 
represents a rejection of  adult reality rooted in Millennial hopelessness: “That’s the revealing duality of  
this 21st century incarnation of  ʻcute’ – it identifies the emptiness in excess that is as true as it is ultimately 
terrifying” (Kretowicz, 2014, para. 12).
A ʻcuteness backlash’ stirs in some western media (e.g., Windolf, 2009), along similar ideological fault lines 
to those arrayed against Japanese kawaii: Conservatives shudder or snort at the immaturity of  it all, while 
progressives bemoan ʻcute culture’s’ consumerist and escapist retreat from political engagement (e.g., McIntyre, 
2015). Yet the current enthusiasm for kitsch and schmaltz has its defenders, of  differing political stripes. They 
herald the sensibility as a bellwether for hopeful societal shifts – toward a revitalized idealism; away from the 
bitterness and prurience of  so much mass media, and even from the western tradition of  ʻbinary thinking’ that 
erects rigid aesthetic, moral and cultural boundaries between people (e.g., Allison, 2006; Napier, 2007; Pratt, 
2014).
Management guru and Ted Talks star Dan Pink predicts as “inevitable” (cited in Clark, 2008, ques. 2) the 
Japan-inspired embrace by western organizations of  cartoon and comic communications for persuasion and 
information-transmission. If  Pink proves prophetic, strategic communicators from political campaigners to 
advertisers will have to weigh all the considerations just discussed: cultural globalization; the affordances and 
constraints of  social media and other new multimedia; a persistent irony in the western (especially Anglo) 
adoption of  cuteness; the nascent norms and anxieties of  Millennials; a risk of  pop-cultural backlash against 
cuteness overplayed or poorly executed. Audience analysis both quantitative and qualitative will be key, and 
organizations will need to sense and follow emergent societal tendencies rather than seeking to transplant 
kawaii tout court. To the extent they are successful in such regards, it is to be hoped they reflect and render real 
the most hopeful aspects, latencies, and possibilities of  kawaii-slash-cuteness as a new lingua franca – one that 
softens our natures without softening our resolve. 
4. Conclusion – Future Directions 
This paper has theorized kawaii and cuteness as a mode of  organizational communication strategy, offering 
a conceptualization or reconceptualization of  these concept-phenomena for both practitioners and those seeking 
to understand or critique such mass media. In Sections 1 and 2, kawaii was discussed as a broad cultural 
descriptor, focusing afterward upon ideological hostilities to the sensibility, both right-conservative and left-
progressive, and both Japanese and western. A defense of  the aesthetic was offered, partly on grounds of  its 
limited influence upon actual behaviour, and partly on grounds that this influence has positive organizational 
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and societal impacts, such as improved attention to tasks or to road signs. Coverage of  Japanese design and 
behavioural research into kawaii effects segued into Section 3’s overview of  related or cognate non-Japanese 
studies, from Lorenz’s 1940s Kindenschema findings to character-branding management scholarship. These 
paper sections and literature reviews supported Section 3’s subsequent argument that western organizations 
have successfully strategized ʻcute communications’ for longer, and continue to do so more widely, than is 
commonly recognized. Section 3 concluded by addressing arguments that cuteness, in many ways influenced by 
kawaii, is a burgeoning pop-cultural sensibility in the west, if  not a profounder societal paradigm shift, to which 
organizational communicators and their commentators must attend.
The fascinating questions and thorny issues involving kawaii or cuteness and surrounding sociocultural 
contexts demand more comparative cross-national study. Globalization’s entwinements ensure that only such 
expansion of  scope will prepare researchers to pinpoint the universals truly in play, rather than formulating 
generalizations based solely on purported peculiarities of  Japan or the Millennials. And this enterprise requires 
research that is more empirically grounded, qualitatively and quantitatively, than the speculation mostly on 
offer, however important the best of  such theory-honing work has been. It is true that psychological and design 
research has made decades of  headway in the science of  cuteness – but with little if  any outside insight from 
sociological or intercultural knowledge. For the most part this work experiments upon western or Japanese 
subjects in contextual isolation, a limitation some researchers highlight (e.g., Nittono, Fukushima, Yano, & 
Moriya, 2012). Such analytic gaps are even more pronounced in organizational-communication research, which 
has not begun to concentrate on the softening power of  cute communications in any regional milieu, much less 
through intercultural lenses. This paper has sought to establish the need for such a focus, given the increasing 
cutesiness of  corporate communications. 
The questions to be answered are many, both for scholars imparting advice to organizational communicators, 
and for those more interested in examining this softening power from the standpoint of  organizational 
audiences, internal or external. Clearly the subject is understudied, but exactly how widespread are cute 
communications already?  What types of  western stakeholders are present or potential targets, and with what 
institutional genres beyond advertisement: public relations, internal communications, instruction or safety 
manuals, retail or workspace layout, product design, foreign affairs? Will ambient cuteness make us more 
productive, more pliant, more attentive, more altruistic? To date, the only empirical research incorporating such 
audience and format specifics has involved Japanese subjects, and these are mostly female university students. 
How cute can communicators get with workers and with men, of  different ages and nationalities? For each 
audience and client demographic, what is the right tactical admixture of  sentiment, nostalgia, irony, and sex 
in cute communication strategy? And of  course, for thinkers of  a critical bent, there will be a countervailing 
directive: to devise and disseminate resistant strategies of  interpretation, and counter-messaging, athwart 
attempts by authorities and businesses to seem adorable though they are not.
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